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Abstract 
We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the 
target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms 
reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more 
efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition 
announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the 
common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition 
uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local 
office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A 
for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors 
act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality 
acquisitions. 
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1. Introduction
This paper examines whether the quality of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is higher 
when the acquiring firm and target firm share the same external auditor.1 Our intuition is that the 
acquisition process often involves considerable uncertainty, including information asymmetry 
between bidders and targets regarding their operations, financial health, risk and prospects as 
well as uncertainty related to post-acquisition operational synergies. This uncertainty can 
negatively impact M&A quality by reducing managers’ ability to identify the most profitable 
investment projects (Goodman et al., 2014). We argue that when an acquirer and target share a 
common auditor, the auditor can help reduce uncertainty along several dimensions.  
First, auditors accumulate a considerable amount of information about their clients 
through conducting their audit procedures and through informal discussions with top 
management, allowing them to be helpful as information intermediaries both before the M&A 
(e.g., identifying potential merger counterparties and assisting with due diligence) and after the 
M&A (e.g., integrating accounting systems and internal controls).  
Second, since each audit firm has its own unique style of interpreting and implementing 
accounting rules (Kothari et al., 2010), firms represented by a common auditor are likely to have 
more comparable financial statements (Francis et al., 2014), which leads to a reduction in 
uncertainty (De Franco et al., 2011). That is, a merging firm can better understand the 
assumptions and choices underlying accounting numbers in financial statements from other firms 
that share the same auditor. In turn, this leads to a better understanding (i.e., reduced uncertainty) 
of those firms’ economics, as compared to those of firms using different auditors.  
Finally, common auditors may be more likely to limit misreporting that asymmetrically 
1 Throughout the paper, acquisition “quality” refers to an acquisition’s impact on firm value. To the extent an 
acquisition results in a greater increase in firm value, it is considered to be of higher quality (Bouwman et al., 2009; 
Goodman et al., 2014; Harford and Uysal, 2014). 
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benefits one party over the other. Prior research indicates that acquirers (Louis, 2004; Gong et al., 
2008) and targets (Anilowski et al., 2009) manage earnings before M&As. Thus, auditors that audit 
both the acquirer and target face greater litigation risk, as the common auditor may be sued for 
earnings management undertaken by either party. Moreover, common auditors likely face greater 
scrutiny by stakeholders, given the potential for conflicts of interest. As Agrawal et al. (2013) 
show, deals with common M&A advisors attract securities class action lawsuits with greater 
frequency than deals with separate advisors. Thus, a common auditor has arguably higher 
incentives to limit misreporting ex ante, leading to reduced uncertainty regarding the accuracy of 
the reported numbers. By reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, common auditors can 
help firms allocate capital more efficiently, resulting in higher quality acquisitions. 
To test whether common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As, we use a 
sample of 1,971 U.S. acquisitions between 1988 and 2010, where both the acquirer and the target 
are public firms and the acquirer obtains complete control of the target after the acquisition. To 
capture M&A quality, we use the acquisition announcement return following a large body of 
research (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2013; 
Goodman et al., 2014).  
We find that M&As involving firms with a common auditor are of higher quality than 
M&As involving firms with different auditors.2 Further, we test and find that the common-
auditor effect is stronger when there is greater pre-acquisition uncertainty, proxied by targets 
with higher growth, more volatility, greater research and development (R&D) intensity, and 
larger bid-ask spreads. Our results are robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables for 
auditor, firm and deal characteristics, the merging firms’ previous business relationships and 
geographical proximity, the existence of shared M&A advisors and/or directors, and additional 
                                                        
2 We also examine two ex post, non-market based M&A quality measures (i.e., post-acquisition change in return on 
assets and the probability of a post-acquisition goodwill impairment) following Goodman et al. (2014), and we find 
qualitatively similar results. See Section 5.2 for more details. 
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testing to address endogeneity concerns related to auditor selection. Collectively, these results 
are consistent with common auditors reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, which leads 
to higher quality M&As. 
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of the common auditor effect, consider that the 
announcement period abnormal returns are 1.064 percentage points higher in common-auditor 
deals than those in non-common-auditor deals. Given that the average market capitalization of an 
acquirer (target) in our sample is $8.99 billion ($870 million), this difference in announcement 
returns translates into an increase in the combined firm’s market capitalization of $104.9 million.3 
We then examine the three mechanisms (discussed above) through which common 
auditors reduce M&A uncertainty: (1) discussions with the M&A parties, (2) financial statement 
comparability, and (3) limited misreporting. With respect to the first mechanism, we employ two 
different empirical approaches. First, we show the common-auditor effect is larger when the 
acquirer and target use the same local office of the common auditor, as the auditor can more 
easily facilitate discussions between these clients if they are all in the same location. Second, we 
show there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor, as the 
auditor can both better match clients interested in engaging in M&A deals and reduce 
uncertainties throughout the process that might otherwise derail the deal.  
To explore the second mechanism, i.e., financial statement comparability, we examine 
whether firms in common-auditor deals have more comparable financial statements than do firms 
in non-common-auditor deals. Using differences in year-specific total accruals (Francis et al., 
2014) and the covariance of earnings across time (Barth et al., 2012; De Franco et al., 2011; 
                                                        
3 That is, ($8.99 billion + $870 million) × 1.064% = $104.9 million. For comparison, consider that Dhaliwal et al. 
(2014) find a 0.7% higher return for acquirers in common-auditor M&As. While our return of 1.06% is a little 
higher, this might be somewhat expected given our sample involves acquisitions where the acquirer ends up with 
100% ownership control after the acquisition instead of 50% (or more) control, as in acquisitions in the Dhaliwal et 
al. (2014) sample. 
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Lang et al., 2010) as proxies for comparability, we find that acquirers and targets with common 
auditors have more comparable financial statements than do those with different auditors.  
We also find less misreporting for common-auditor mergers, the third mechanism, using 
performance-matched abnormal accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) and financial statement 
restatements (Bens et al., 2012) as proxies for misreporting. Combined, these results support our 
inferences that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process by improving (public 
and private) communication channels. 
Finally, we examine whether the common-auditor effect is mitigated after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). Section 201 of SOX prohibits auditors from engaging in non-audit services, 
such as M&A advisory and consulting services. To the extent auditors were engaged in non-audit 
services before SOX and common auditors used these services to help their clients engage in 
better acquisitions, the common-auditor effect should be mitigated post-SOX. However, we find 
that the common-auditor effect remains after SOX. This result suggests that the role of common 
auditors in reducing uncertainty is unlikely driven by non-audit function communications. 
An important caveat to our findings is that, despite all our empirical analyses, discussions 
between auditors and their clients are unobservable. Thus, we cannot directly speak to the amount or 
type of information provided by common auditors during M&As. Given American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Rule 301 prohibits disclosure of confidential information 
without consent from the client, if auditor discussions do indeed contain relevant private information, 
it should be approved by the appropriate parties; that said, we recognize there is potential for 
conflicts of interest to arise. We leave this for future research and regulators to determine.4  
Our study makes several important contributions. First, we add to the literature that 
examines the role of auditors in M&As. Prior studies generally examine the roles of acquirer 
                                                        
4 Consistent with conflict of interest concerns, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find that M&As with a shared auditor are 
associated with lower deal premiums and higher (lower) acquirer (target) event returns, which suggests shared 
auditors favor acquirers during M&As.  
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auditors and target auditors separately. For example, Louis (2005) studies the role of acquirer 
auditors in M&A transactions and finds higher acquisition announcement returns for non-Big 4 
firms, while other studies find that targets with Big 4 auditors are more likely to get acquired 
(Xie et al., 2013) and have greater acquisition synergy and higher acquirer announcement returns 
(Golubov et al., 2012). In this study, we consider both acquirer auditors and target auditors in 
examining how sharing an auditor influences acquisition performance, providing new insights 
into the role of auditors in M&As. 
Second, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the real effects of accounting 
and auditing. In particular, prior research finds that accounting information facilitates more 
efficient corporate investment by reducing agency problems caused by information asymmetry 
(e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Biddle and Hilary, 2006), by providing peer firms with more 
information (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2013), and by providing information to managers within the 
firm (Shroff, 2014; McNichols and Stubben, 2008). In addition, Kausar et al. (2014) show that 
firms’ choice to obtain an audit helps lower information asymmetry and leads to more efficient 
investment. We contribute to this line of research by showing that common auditors reduce 
uncertainty in the M&A process, and thus improve M&A quality.  
Third, we contribute to the large literature examining the effect of sharing an agent on 
economic outcomes. For example, the economics literature analyzes the use of a common agent 
as a way for competitors to achieve implicit collusion (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1985; Gal-
Or, 1985, 1986; Vives, 1990). In this setting, a common agent behaves passively and information 
transfers among competitors can be widely observed. In contrast, Villas-Boas (1994) and 
Gardiner et al. (2007) consider a setting where a common agent can act strategically, and 
examine conflicts that arise from sharing the same advertising agency and sharing the same real 
estate agent. More closely related to our study, Agrawal et al. (2013) examine the role of 
common investment bank advisors in M&As, and find that such deals are somewhat better for 
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acquirers than they are for targets. Similarly, Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that board connections 
favor the acquirer, but the manner of benefit is a function of the type of board connection. We 
contribute to this literature by providing evidence on the impact of sharing an auditor on M&A 
outcomes as well as the mechanisms through which these outcomes manifest. 
Finally, our study complements concurrent work by Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who also 
examine the role of common auditors in M&A transactions. Our study delves into the 
mechanisms through which common auditors affect M&A outcomes. We find evidence 
consistent with the common auditor resolving information uncertainty between the parties in the 
transaction. Dhaliwal et al. (2014) examine whether one party reaps greater benefits from the 
deals and find evidence consistent with the acquirer capturing the benefits, as indicated by higher 
acquirer event returns. In addition, Dhaliwal et al.’s study suggests that target firm shareholders 
may be worse off because target event returns and deal premiums are lower. While Dhaliwal et 
al.’s wealth transfer result is certainly interesting, we find that the overall combined 
announcement return is positive. We caution, however, that the studies use somewhat different 
samples and tests, and thus the results cannot be fully interpreted together. We leave it to future 
research to further examine the various aspects and consequences of a common auditor in M&A 
transactions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the M&A process 
as well as how a common auditor can help reduce uncertainties in that process. Section 3 
describes the sample selection process, and Section 4 details the research design and empirical 
results. We present additional analyses in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Motivation 
Mergers and acquisitions represent significant corporate events that involve a thorough 
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and dynamic process that can vary from several months to several years to complete. In general, 
the M&A process starts with the identification of potential target candidates, which is a function 
of the firm’s strategic objectives and requires some preliminary screening of the candidates. 
After a candidate is chosen, the firm engages in a lengthy due diligence process, which includes 
developing an extensive understanding of the target value as a stand-alone business as well as the 
value of potential synergies (Copeland et al., 2000). As GE Capital (2012) indicates,  
“Due diligence is not a courtship, a negotiation, or an inquisition; it’s a fact-finding mission…[y]our business 
review of the target becomes a true audit, aimed at gaining a thorough understanding of the target’s 
operations, assets, liabilities, and outlook. Your due diligence team will be looking to confirm the target’s 
representations, validate its valuation, probe any legal, regulatory and compliance concerns, and affirm 
expected synergies and integration plans.”  
After obtaining considerable information through the due diligence phase, negotiations begin 
between the acquirer and target regarding the acquisition price, the deal structure, etc. When the 
negotiations are done and the deal is complete, the firms enter the final phase—the integration of 
the two firms. There are numerous factors for the acquiring firm to consider during the 
integration phase, such as the development and articulation of the vision for the new entity to 
employees and other stakeholders, legal and tax issues, human resource issues (e.g., employee 
retention/severance), and fixed asset allocations. Further, underlying all of these factors is the 
integration of the accounting information systems to capture these economic changes. 
As becomes apparent through the above discussion of the M&A process, each phase 
contains significant uncertainty. From identifying merger partners to conducting due diligence to 
valuing and negotiating the deal to post-M&A integration, managers face uncertainty throughout 
the process and its negative impact on firm value. In particular, extant research indicates that 
uncertainty negatively affects acquirer announcement returns and post-acquisition performance 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2014; Erickson et al., 2012) and that having more firm-specific target 
information helps improve acquirer returns and the expected value of combined firms (Martin 
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and Shalev, 2009). Given M&As are typically large and important corporate transactions, 
managerial incentives are strong to combat adverse selection inherent in the identification and 
valuation of potential deals.  As a result, firms often turn to investment bankers to serve as 
advisors during the M&A process. Consistent with uncertainty driving firms’ decisions to retain 
M&A advisors, Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that acquirers hire advisors when the deals are 
more complex and when the acquirer lacks prior acquisition experience. Investment banks can 
help match acquirers with targets, advise acquirers on target valuation, and/or counsel firms in 
negotiating the deal price and structure (Goodman et al. 2014).  
While firms hire investment banks to reduce uncertainty in an attempt to make better 
investment decisions, we argue that auditors can also serve to reduce uncertainty in the M&A 
process, even though they are not explicitly retained by firms to do so. In particular, auditors that 
audit both the acquirer and target (i.e., common auditors) can reduce M&A uncertainty through 
several channels. The first, and arguably most important, channel is the direct communication of 
information between the common auditor and the acquirers and targets, which can happen 
throughout the M&A process. As indicated to us in a private conversation with a Big 4 
accounting partner, auditors often introduce their clients as potential acquisition partners. Thus, 
the auditor can facilitate discussions at the initial stage of the M&A process.  
Auditors can also provide considerable value during the due diligence phase, which 
includes assessing the target firm’s financial health, risks, prospects, etc. After all, many of these 
assessments (or similar assessments) are made by the auditor during an audit, so they can assist 
by providing both structure to the due diligence processes/analyses and insights into the target 
based on their extensive knowledge of the firm. In fact, further discussion with the Big 4 partner 
revealed that, with the consent of clients, audit team members of the acquirer and the target often 
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exchange information.5 These discussions can be very useful in appropriately valuing firms, and 
thus in negotiating the deal. 
The transfer of information between common-auditor clients continues even after the 
M&A as well. For example, common auditors can help integrate accounting information systems 
and internal control systems following deal completion, which is a nontrivial task that is vital to the 
success of the M&A. Since common auditors are familiar with these systems for both the acquiring 
firm and the target firm, they can more efficiently amalgamate the systems to better capture the 
firm’s economics. Erickson et al. (2012) report increases in uncertainty after M&As, which 
contributes to acquirers’ post-acquisition wealth losses. Common auditors can help reduce this 
uncertainty by assisting with the integration of the accounting information systems to better capture 
the underlying economics of the firm. 
The second channel through which common auditors can reduce uncertainty is via financial 
statement comparability. Kothari et al. (2010) argue that each accounting firm has its own unique set 
of internal working rules that guide and standardize the audit firm’s application of accounting and 
auditing standards.6 Francis et al. (2014) argue that because these systematic differences exist across 
audit firms, financial statements are more similar for firms with a common auditor than they are for 
firms with different auditors. In addition, clients often seek guidance from their auditors when 
preparing financial reports, which further contributes to increased comparability of financial 
statements across firms with a common auditor.7  Consistent with common auditors influencing 
                                                        
5 The audit partner also notes that, because of the mandatory audit partner rotation rule, audit firms sometimes bring 
an audit partner from another office. Therefore, the audit partner of the acquirer (target) could be a member of the 
former audit team for the target (acquirer), which further reduces information asymmetry in M&As. 
6 Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that big audit firms do not pass authority downstream to the regional headquarters or 
onto the actual auditors as much as they used to do. Interpretations of rules in accounting firms are now made at the 
accounting firm level instead of from the field. 
7 As an example of auditors’ influence on their clients’ disclosure behavior, Blacconiere et al. (2011) show that Ernst and 
Young (E&Y) clients are four times more likely to disavow the reliability of mandated fair-value disclosures than are the 
clients of other audit firms. They note that E&Y included a disavowal as an illustrative disclosure in its Statement of 
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comparability between firms’ financial statements, Francis et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms 
audited by the same auditor have more comparable earnings than firms audited by different auditors. 
By enhancing financial statement comparability, common auditors indirectly provide their clients 
information that other (non-client) firms may not be able to efficiently obtain. In particular, a client 
firm can better understand the assumptions and accounting choices underlying the financial 
statement numbers of other client firms. In turn, this knowledge leads to a reduction in 
uncertainty regarding those firms’ economics.  
The third channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is by 
limiting financial statement misreporting. Erickson and Wang (1999) find that acquirers boost 
earnings prior to stock-for-stock acquisitions in an effort to increase their stock price and reduce the 
number of shares issued in exchange. Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008) confirm these findings and 
show that the long-term post-acquisition underperformance of stock-for-stock acquirers and post-
acquisition lawsuits can be attributed to pre-acquisition abnormal accruals. Anilowski et al. (2009) 
find that targets also engage in earnings management and sell via auctions to avoid the risk of 
detection. The authors also find that such deals result in higher wealth gains to target shareholders.  
Given the incentives for both acquirers and targets to manage earnings before M&As, 
auditors that audit both the acquirer and target face greater litigation risk, as the common auditor 
may be sued for earnings management undertaken by either party. Moreover, common auditors 
likely face greater scrutiny by stakeholders, given their role as a common agent with the 
opportunity for conflicts of interest. As Agrawal et al. (2013) document, deals with common M&A 
advisors attract securities class action lawsuits with greater frequency than deals with separate 
advisors. To the extent common auditors face greater litigation (and potentially reputational) risk, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Financial Accounting Standards 123 implementation guidance and encouraged clients to adopt the disclosure. 
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they have greater incentives to limit misreporting that asymmetrically benefits one party over the 
other, resulting in more transparent financial information and reduced uncertainty. 
Collectively, common auditors can help reduce uncertainty throughout the various stages of 
the M&A process both directly through private communications with the acquirer and target and 
indirectly through more comparable and more transparent public financial reports. This reduction in 
uncertainty regarding the firms’ underlying economics facilitates better matching and integration of 
acquirers with targets, which leads to higher quality investment decisions.  
 
3. Sample Selection 
To conduct our analyses, we obtain a sample of acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters 
Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. We identify all completed 
domestic mergers and acquisitions of public acquirers and public targets with announcement dates 
between 1988 and 2010. We start our sample period in 1988 because we obtain auditor information 
from Compustat, and its auditor coverage prior to 1988 is limited to Big 8 auditors. We exclude 
small transactions in which the deal value is less than $1 million and/or less than 1% of the acquirer’s 
market capitalization prior to the announcement date. We also require the acquirer to control less 
than 50% of the target before the announcement and own 100% after the deal completion to ensure a 
complete change in control.8 We further limit our sample to deals in which both the acquirer and the 
target have daily stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the 
annual accounting data and auditor information from Compustat for at least one year prior to the deal 
                                                        
8 Untabulated results show that the common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals where the acquirer owns no 
target shares before the deal, but owns 100% of the target after the deal completion. To the extent pre-acquisition 
uncertainty is greater for such deals, this evidence suggests that common auditors have a greater impact when there 
is more uncertainty. 
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announcement. Applying these filters leaves a final sample of 1,971 acquisitions, where 547 (1,424) 
acquisitions are classified as common auditors (non-common-auditor) deals.  
Table 1, Panel A presents the distribution of our sample by deal announcement year. 
Consistent with the M&A literature, the number of acquisitions drops in the early 2000s from its 
highest level in the late 1990s. We also observe a significant slowdown following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. The patterns of common-auditor deals and non-common-auditor deals across years 
follow trends similar to that of the overall sample. 
Table 1, Panel B shows the industry composition for the acquiring firms in our sample using 
the Fama and French 48 industry classification (Fama and French, 1997). Business services, 
computers, and pharmaceutical products are the most active industries in our sample in terms of the 
number of acquisitions. We observe a similar pattern in common-auditor deals and non-common-
auditor deals. Given the variations in merger activity both across time and across industry, as 
observed in Table 1, we include both year and industry fixed effects in our multivariate analyses. 
 
4. Research design and empirical results 
In this section, we discuss our research design and empirical results related to our three 
main analyses. First, we examine the relation between common auditors and M&A quality. 
Second, we test whether the relation between common auditors and M&A quality is stronger 
when there is greater pre-M&A uncertainty. Finally, we analyze the three mechanisms through 
which common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, namely via (i) private 
discussions with the acquirer and target, (ii) enhanced financial statement comparability, and (iii) 
limited misreporting.  
4.1. Common auditors and M&A quality 
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4.1.1. M&A quality measure 
 
As discussed earlier, we predict that M&As with a common auditor are higher quality 
because common auditors are able to reduce uncertainty throughout the M&A process, which 
allows the parties to better identify profitable investment opportunities. We use the acquisition 
announcement return as our proxy for M&A quality following a large body of research (e.g., 
Asquith et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Kale et al., 2003; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Agrawal et 
al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2014). In particular, following Bradley et al. (1988), Kale et al. 
(2003) and Cai and Sevilir (2012), we measure portfolio cumulative abnormal returns of the 
combined portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the acquisition announcement, 
ANN_CAR. We obtain the announcement dates from the SDC U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
database and estimate portfolio abnormal returns using the standard event study method 
developed by Brown and Warner (1985). We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the 
market return and estimate the market model parameters over the two hundred trading days 
ending two months before the merger announcement.9 For each acquisition, we form a value-
weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, with the weights based on their market 
capitalization at two months prior to the acquisition announcement date. To avoid double 
counting the acquirer’s existing ownership in the target, we subtract the market value of the 
target equity held by the acquirer from the target’s market capitalization. We then calculate the 
three-day ANN_CARs over the event window (-1, +1), where event day 0 is the acquisition 
announcement date.  
4.1.2. Empirical design – Common auditors and M&A quality 
                                                        
9 Schwert (1996) finds that, on average, the target firm stock price starts to rise about two months before the initial 
bid announcement, suggesting investor anticipation or information leakage before the deal announcement. To 
minimize the potential bias in estimating market model parameters, our estimation period ends two months before 
the merger announcement. 
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To test whether acquisitions are of higher quality in common-auditor deals than in non-
common-auditor deals, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model: 
      ANN_CAR = α + β Common auditor + γ Controls + Year FE + Industry FE + ε,    (1) 
where the dependent variable, ANN_CAR, is defined above. Our main variable of interest, Common 
auditor, is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor 
and zero otherwise. We include calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed 
effects, and the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by acquirer. 
Controls represents numerous control variables for auditor, firm, and deal characteristics 
shown by prior research to impact M&A quality, where all of the control variables are defined in 
the Appendix. Specifically, with respect to auditor characteristics, we control for whether the 
acquirer and/or target have a Big 4 auditor, Big 4 Auditor, as Louis (2004) finds that acquirers 
audited by non–Big 4 firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms, and Xie et al. (2013) and 
Golubov et al. (2012) show that target auditor size is associated with various deal outcomes.10 
We also control for the industry dominance of auditors, Auditor industry dominance, as auditors 
with more industry expertise may lead to better acquisition outcomes (Craswell et al., 1995; 
Hogan and Jeter, 1999; Solomon et al., 1999; Owhoso et al., 2002). With respect to firm 
characteristics, we control for Size, Operating cash flows and Tobin’s Q to capture a firm’s 
growth opportunities and financing availability (Moeller et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2006). We also 
include Leverage to control for creditor monitoring (Maloney et al., 1993; Masulis et al., 2007) 
and Pre-announcement stock price run-up (Rosen, 2006) for both the acquirer and target. 
Finally, we include several commonly used deal characteristic control variables, i.e., Relative 
                                                        
10 Throughout the paper, we use “Big 4” to mean Big 8, Big 6, Big 5, or Big 4 during our sample period. Big 8 (eight 
largest audit firms) became Big 6 in 1989 when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to form Ernst & Young 
and when Deloitte, Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross to form Deloitte & Touche. The 1998 merger between 
Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse created Big 5, and the Arthur Andersen demise in 2002 resulted in Big 4. 
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deal size (Asquith et al., 1983), Percentage of stock financing (Travlos, 1987; Moeller et al., 
2004), Tender offer indicator, Hostile bid indicator (Schwert, 2000), Multiple bidders indicator 
(Mitchell et al., 2004), and High-tech firms indicator (Masulis et al., 2007). 
In addition to the auditor, firm and deal characteristic controls, we control for several 
additional variables. In particular, Morck et al. (1990) show that when the acquirer and target 
are similar, the acquisition has greater announcement returns. If firms with greater similarity 
tend to hire the same accounting firm as well, firm similarity could be a correlated omitted 
variable. Accordingly, we control for whether the deal is a diversifying acquisition, 
Diversifying acquisition, as well as the daily stock return correlation between the acquirer and 
the target prior to the acquisition announcement, Corr(stock return), following Fama and 
French (1992).11  
We also include several controls for M&As where the acquirer and target may already have 
considerable knowledge of one another. In particular, we control for whether the acquirer and target 
have had a previous business relationship (i.e., strategic alliance or joint venture) in the three years 
before the acquisition, Previous business relation, as Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that 
acquisitions generate better announcement returns if they are preceded by strategic alliance activity 
between the acquirer and the target. In a similar vein, we also control for the acquirer’s equity 
ownership percentage in the target before the deal announcement, Toehold.12 Finally, we control for 
whether the acquirer’s headquarters are in close geographic proximity to the headquarters of the 
                                                        
11 We find that the mean Corr(stock return) is 0.21 (0.18) in common-auditor (non-common-auditor) deals. The difference 
is significant at the 1% level, suggesting acquirers and targets display greater similarity in common-auditor deals. 
12 Our results are robust if we instead define Toehold as an indicator variable for whether the acquirer owns any 
equity in the target prior to the deal announcement. 
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target, Local deal, as Uysal et al. (2008) find that acquirer announcement returns in local deals 
are higher than those in nonlocal deals.13  
4.1.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our M&A quality measure, ANN_CAR, in Panel 
A as well as our control variables in Panel B. As indicated in Panel A, the mean and median 
three-day ANN_CARs for the full sample are 1.91% and 1.22%, respectively, and both are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These positive portfolio returns are consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Wang and Xie, 2009). Columns 2 and 3 present the 
subsample statistics where we split the full sample into common-auditor deals and non-common-
auditor deals. As shown, the mean (median) difference in three-day ANN_CAR between 
common-auditor deals and non-common-auditor deals is 1.06% (0.30%), which is statistically 
significantly at the 1% (5%) level. To ensure these results are not sensitive to the length of the 
return window, we also examine five-day and seven-day announcement windows and continue to 
find significantly higher ANN_CARs in common-auditor deals than in non-common-auditor 
deals. For our main analyses, we report the results using the three-day ANN_CAR for brevity. 
As shown in Panel B of Table 2, the majority of acquirers (97%) and targets (94%) in our 
sample have Big 4 auditors. Moreover, common-auditor deals are more likely than non-common-
auditor deals to involve Big 4 auditors for both the acquirer and the target. Target firms’ auditors 
in common-auditor deals have more industry expertise, as they are more likely to be the 
dominant auditor in the two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry. We also find 
that target firms are associated with lower operating cash flows in common-auditor deals and that 
such acquisitions are less likely to be hostile takeovers and less likely to have competing bidders. 
                                                        
13 We use the SDC database to collect zip code data for acquirer and target headquarters. When SDC zip code data 
are missing, we collect the data from SEC filings on the Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) database, and collect the data from Compustat for years before EDGAR. 
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In addition, acquirer and target returns are more highly correlated, acquirers own more of the 
targets’ stock prior to the acquisitions, and acquirer and target headquarters are more likely to be 
located in the same geographical area in common-auditor deals than in non-common-auditor 
deals. We control for these auditor, firm, and deal characteristics in our analyses. 
4.1.4. Multivariate analysis – Common auditors and M&A quality 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using OLS. In Column 1, we do not 
include any control variables and find that common auditors have a positive and significant effect on 
ANN_CAR. In Column 2, we include auditor, firm, and deal characteristic control variables as well as 
controls for firm similarity, previous business relations, and geographic proximity. Our baseline 
finding continues to hold with these control variables; the coefficient estimate for Common auditor is 
1.064 and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting M&As involving firms with a common 
auditor have higher quality acquisitions.  
The coefficients for the control variables are also consistent with findings in the literature. 
For example, we observe a negative correlation between acquirer size and announcement returns 
(Kimbrough and Louis, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012), acquisitions with greater relative deal size have 
higher announcement returns (Louis and Sun, 2010), highly stock-financed deals are associated with 
lower announcement returns (Louis, 2005), announcement returns are higher in tender offers 
(Golubov et al., 2012; Cai and Sevilir, 2012), and deals in which the acquirer and the target are in 
different industries are associated with lower announcement returns (Morck et al., 1990). 
4.2. Common-auditor effect and uncertainty 
We next examine the impact of common auditors on M&A quality conditioned on the 
amount of pre-M&A uncertainty. If common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As 
because they reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, then we should observe a larger common-
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auditor effect when there is a greater degree of uncertainty before the M&A. To test this 
prediction, we adjust Equation (1) to include a proxy of uncertainty and interact it with the common-
auditor indicator, as shown below.  
ANN_CAR = β0 + β1Common auditor + β2Uncertainty + β3Common auditor*Uncertainty  
+ γ Controls + Year FE + Industry FE + ε,        (2) 
where ANN_CAR and Common auditor are defined previously. We predict that β3 is positive, as this 
indicates that the common-auditor effect is larger when there is greater pre-M&A uncertainty. 
We focus on the acquirer’s uncertainty regarding the target (rather than vice versa), because while the 
target faces some uncertainty regarding its asking price and the associated contract terms, the 
acquirer faces significant uncertainty regarding the target valuation in addition to determining its bid 
price and associated contract terms. Moreover, while the target no longer exists after the merger, the 
acquirer still faces considerable post-acquisition uncertainty associated with synergistic incorporation 
of the target (as outlined in section 2). Thus, common auditors can be much more helpful for 
acquirers than they can for targets in reducing uncertainty. Accordingly, we focus on uncertainty 
regarding the target.  
Our first proxy for uncertainty is based on the target firm’s sales growth. Smith and Watts 
(1992) argue that high growth firms are associated with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry. Thus, we expect uncertainty regarding the target to be more severe, and thus the 
common-auditor effect on acquisition quality to be more pronounced, when the target is growing at a 
more rapid pace. We define Target sales growth as the percentage change in the target’s sales from 
the previous year.  
Our second proxy for uncertainty is the stock return volatility of the target firm. 
Estimating the true underlying value of target firms that have higher stock return volatilities is 
more difficult (Officer et al., 2009; McNichols and Stubben, 2014), and common auditors could 
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play a more important role in such deals. We define Target stock return volatility as the daily 
stock return volatility of the target over the one-year period ending two months prior to the deal 
announcement.  
Our third measure of uncertainty is based on the target firm’s R&D intensity (Aboody and 
Lev, 2000; Huddart and Ke, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that 
interpreting financial information is difficult for firms with high R&D intensity because (i) R&D 
investments are more unique than investments in tangible assets, (ii) no liquid market exists for 
R&D investments, and (iii) the information necessary to determine the value of assets that emerge 
from R&D investments is harder to obtain. We define Target R&D intensity as the ratio of current 
year R&D expenditure to sales in the year prior to the deal announcement. 
Our fourth measure of uncertainty is the bid-ask spread of the target firm. The bid-ask 
spread is a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry because it represents one way that 
market makers protect themselves from expected losses in trading with more informed traders 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Following LaFond and Watts (2008) and Khan and Watts (2009), we 
obtain daily bid-ask spread from CRSP and scale it by the midpoint of the spread. We define 
Target bid-ask spread as the average of the daily spreads of the target firm over the one-year 
period ending two months prior to the deal announcement. 14 
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (2), where the results are based on 
using Target sales growth, Target stock return volatility, Target R&D intensity, and Target bid-ask 
spread as proxies for uncertainty in Column 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In particular, the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction of Common auditor and the uncertainty proxies (i.e, β3) is positive and 
                                                        
14 Note that our uncertainty measures are potentially susceptible to endogeneity concerns. For example, target 
managers’ disclosure behavior may affect the level of uncertainty measured by stock return volatility or bid ask 
spread. Similarly, managers’ operating strategies may affect the firms’ sales growth or R&D intensity. If factors that 
influence these decisions are correlated with the firms’ choice to use a common auditor or result in a higher 
acquisition announcement return, our results may be biased. 
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statistically significant at the 5% level or better across all four specifications. The evidence in Table 
4 suggests that common auditors have a greater impact on M&A quality when there is more 
uncertainty before the acquisition.15 
4.3. Mechanisms of reductions in uncertainty 
Next, we examine the three main channels through which common auditors reduce 
uncertainty in the M&A process: (i) discussions with the acquirer and target regarding the M&A, 
(ii) enhanced financial statement comparability, and (iii) increased reporting transparency.  
4.3.1. Primary information channel - Discussions regarding M&A  
The primary channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is via 
direct discussions with the acquirer and target. As discussed in section 2, common auditors can 
help reduce uncertainty throughout the M&A process, from assistance in the identification and 
matching of potential M&A targets to help during the due diligence phase with valuing the target 
to post-acquisition integration of information systems. Unfortunately, these discussions are not 
observable; as such, we employ two different empirical approaches. First, we examine whether 
the common-auditor effect is larger when the acquirer and target use the same local office of the 
common auditor. The intuition is that the auditor can more easily facilitate discussions between 
clients if they are in the same location as both the acquirer and the target. Second, we examine 
whether there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Since an 
auditor is much more knowledgeable about its own clients, it can not only better match clients 
                                                        
15 We also test whether the sum of β2 and β3 are significant in each of the four specifications, and find that only in 
the first specification (using Target sales growth) is the sum statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, there is 
weak evidence that uncertainty has a positive effect on announcement returns for common-auditor M&As (as 
opposed to just higher returns than those in non-common auditor M&As). One potential reason for this finding is 
that to the extent auditors can better identify targets that may be undervalued more because of their inherent 




interested in engaging in M&A transactions, but also reduce uncertainties throughout the process 
that might otherwise derail the M&A. Accordingly, we predict that if common auditors help 
facilitate information flow via discussions with their clients, there should be a higher probability 
of an M&A with other firms that share the same auditor.   
To conduct our first analysis (i.e., same-office test), we collect auditor office location 
data from Audit Analytics, which provides audit office location data starting in 2002. For deals 
announced before 2002 and/or with missing auditor office data in Audit Analytics, we manually 
collect the data from the audit report in Form 10-K filings. Because Form 10-K filings are 
unavailable in the SEC EDGAR system before 1996, our sample is reduced to 1,591 
observations. Of the 1,591 observations, 459 deals (28.8%) involve a common auditor, and 120 
deals (7.5%) consist of a common auditor in the same local office. Using these data, we adapt 
Equation (1) by splitting Common auditor into two measures, Same-office common auditor and 
Different-office common auditor, where Same-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if 
the acquirer and the target share a common auditor from the same local office and zero otherwise, 
and Different-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer and the target share a 
common auditor from different local offices and zero otherwise.  
We report the results on same-office common auditors in Table 5. Column 1 reports the 
results from estimating Equation (1) using the reduced sample. We find that common auditors are 
associated with significantly higher combined announcement returns, consistent with the results in 
Table 3. In Column 2, we report the results from estimating Equation 1, where we split Common 
auditor into the two measures:  Same-office common auditor and Different-office common auditor. 
While the coefficients on both variables are significantly positive, the coefficient on Same-office 
common auditor is greater than the coefficient on Different-office common auditor, and this 
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difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that while common 
auditors can enhance M&A quality, they are more effective at doing so when the acquirer and target 
are audited by the same local audit office.  
To conduct our second analysis (i.e., common-auditor M&A likelihood test), we follow a 
method similar to that in Bodnaruk et al. (2009) in examining the probability of two firms 
engaging in M&A activities. Specifically, for each actual acquirer, we define the set of all potential 
acquirers as those covered by Compustat in the same three-digit SIC industry and of a similar size 
(within a 20 percent band of market capitalization).16 We perform the same procedure for each actual 
target firm and find its corresponding set of potential target firms. We then identify whether a 
common auditor exists between each potential acquirer and each potential target, and we create an 
indicator variable, Common auditor, that equals one if the potential acquirer and the potential target 
in a given deal share the same auditor at the time of the deal announcement and zero otherwise. We 
then estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one 
if an acquisition takes place between the potential acquirer and the potential target and zero 
otherwise.  
Table 6 reports the marginal effects from estimating the probit regression. Column 1 
includes only the year and industry fixed effects. In Column 2, we follow Bodnaruk et al. (2009) 
and include a number of control variables, including firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage ratio, ROA, 
sales growth, stock return, stock return volatility, and industry Herfindahl index of the potential 
merging firms. In both models, we find that sharing a common auditor significantly increases the 
likelihood of an acquisition. After controlling for other determinants of acquisition likelihood, 
                                                        
16  Alternative matching based on different industry definitions (two-digit SIC industry, Fama and French 48 
industries) or different size bands (10%, 30%) delivers similar results. 
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sharing a common auditor increases the likelihood of an M&A between clients by 0.2 percentage 
points, which is sizable given that the sample mean of the probability of an M&A is 0.7 percent.  
4.3.2. Secondary information channel - Financial statement comparability 
The second channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is via 
enhanced financial statement comparability. As discussed above, because each audit firm has a 
unique style of interpreting and implementing accounting rules (Francis et al., 2014; Blacconiere 
et al., 2011), firms can better understand the assumptions and choices underlying accounting 
numbers in financial statements from firms that share the same auditor. In turn, this leads to a 
better understanding of those firms’ economics, relative to that of firms using different auditors. 
To determine whether common-auditor firms engaged in an M&A have greater financial 
statement comparability, we conduct two analyses. First, we use the difference in the firms’ year-
specific total accruals as a proxy for comparability following Francis et al. (2014). In particular, 
we calculate the absolute value of the difference in total accruals between the acquirer and the 
target in the year prior to acquisition announcement (Diff_Total_Accruals), where total accruals 
are calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows from 
operations, scaled by beginning of year total assets.17 We then regress Diff_Total_Accruals on 
Common auditor and several control variables. Specifically, following Francis et al. (2014), we 
control for the minimum values and differences in size, leverage, market-to-book, cash flow 
from operations, losses, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations, and standard deviation of sales growth. We also exclude financial institutions 
because characteristics of accruals differ in these firms (Louis, 2004). Eliminating observations 
with data restrictions and financial institutions reduces our sample size to 1,679 observations. 
                                                        
17 We also examine the absolute value of the difference in abnormal accruals between the acquirer and the target in 
the year prior to acquisition announcement, where abnormal accruals are calculated following Kothari et al. (2005). 
The untabulated results using abnormal accruals are similar to those using total accruals. 
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Second, as an alternate proxy for financial statement comparability, we use the firms’ 
covariance of earnings across time (Barth et al., 2012; De Franco et al., 2011; Lang et al., 2010). 
Specifically, we estimate the earnings co-movement between the acquirer and the target in the 16 
quarters prior to acquisition announcement (ECOMP_COV), where we measure the level of 
covariance as the adjusted R2 from the regression of the acquirer’s income before extraordinary 
items scaled by total assets on the target’s income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets. We then regress ECOMP_COV on Common auditor and several control variables. In 
particular, we include the same control variables used in the total accruals analysis, plus we 
control for cash flow comovement and return comovement across 16 consecutive quarters 
(Francis et al., 2014). We require at least 10 quarters of data available for both the acquirer and 
the target in estimating earnings comovement. These data restrictions reduce the sample size to 
1,513 observations.18  
 Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of the comparability tests. In particular, 
Column 1 (2) shows the results from our comparability analysis using differences in total 
accruals (earnings comovement) as our proxy for financial statement comparability. As indicated 
in both columns, the coefficient estimate for Common auditor is statistically significant in the 
predicted directions. Specifically, in column 1, the coefficient for Common auditor (-0.020) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that there are smaller differences in total 
accruals between acquirers and targets in common-auditor M&As, as compared to those in non-
common-auditor M&As. In column 2, the coefficient for Common auditor (0.026) is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating greater earnings comovement for acquirers and targets in 
common-auditor M&As relative to those in non-common-auditor M&As. Combined, the results 
                                                        
18 We also examine the effect of common auditors using another comparability measure developed in De Franco et 
al. (2011), which is based on the similarity of the mapping of earnings to stock returns across firms. Untabulated 
results using this alternative comparability measure are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. 
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in Table 7 provide support for the notion that the financial statements of acquirers and targets are 
more comparable in common-auditor M&As than they are in non-common-auditor M&As.  
4.3.3. Secondary information channel – Limited misreporting 
The third channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is by 
limiting misreporting and/or increasing the confidence of the acquirer (target) that the target’s 
(acquirer’s) financial statements are accurate. As discussed above, both acquirers and targets 
have incentives to manage earnings. Thus, auditors that audit both the acquirer and the target face 
greater litigation risk as well as greater scrutiny by stakeholders, given their role as a common 
agent with the opportunity for conflicts of interest. To the extent common auditors face greater 
litigation (and potentially reputational) risk, they have greater incentives to limit misreporting that 
asymmetrically benefits one party over the other, resulting in more transparent financial information 
and reduced uncertainty. 
To determine whether there is less misreporting for common-auditor M&As relative to 
non-common-auditor M&As, we use performance-matched abnormal accruals (Kothari et al., 
2005) and financial statement restatements (Bens et al., 2012) as proxies for misreporting. For 
the accrual analysis, we examine both acquirer and target accruals; however, for the restatement 
analysis, we examine restatements made by the newly merged firm. Since our sample of 
acquisitions consists of acquirers obtaining 100% ownership, the new company is a combination 
of the acquirer and target. As such, when a restatement is announced, we cannot identify whether 
it was the acquirer or the target that initiated the earnings management. That is, the restatements 
are announced for the new company rather than the acquirer or target separately, as consolidated 
statements are presented for those earlier (pre-M&A) years.  
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For our first misreporting analysis, we estimate quarterly unexpected accruals in the spirit 
of Erickson and Wang (1999). Following Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008), we focus on 
current accruals because long-term accruals are less susceptible to manipulation in the short run 
(Healy, 1985). Following the suggestion of Kothari et al. (2005), we control for firm 
performance by matching on contemporaneous ROA (calculated as income before extraordinary 
items scaled by lagged total assets). 19  Specifically, quarterly unexpected accruals are the 
residuals from the estimation of the following model: 
  CACCit /ATit-1 = α11/AT it-1 + α2∆REVit /AT it-1 + α3Q1 + α4Q2 + α5Q3 + α6Q4 + Year FE + εit,     (3) 
where CACCit represents current accruals for firm i in quarter t, ATit-1 is total assets for firm i in 
quarter t-1, ∆REVit is the change in revenue for firm i in quarter t, and Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) is an indicator 
that equals one for the first (second, third, fourth) fiscal quarter and zero otherwise. All indicator 
variables are deflated by lagged total assets. We estimate the model for each two-digit SIC industry. 
We follow Erickson and Wang (1999) and focus on three quarters, q-2, q-1, and q0, where q0 is the last 
quarter for which earnings are announced prior to the acquisition announcement. Unexpected 
accruals (UA), our proxy for earnings management, is the sum of q-2, q-1, and q0 unexpected accruals 
minus unexpected accruals of the industry-and-performance-matched firm.20  
Table 8 provides the results from regressing UA on the Common auditor indicator. We 
report the acquirers’ UA in Columns 1 and 2 and targets’ UA in Columns 3 and 4. We include only 
year and industry fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, and we include the full set of control variables 
                                                        
19 As Kothari et al. (2005, p. 166) note, “[D]iscretionary accruals estimated using the Jones or the modified-Jones 
model, and adjusted for a performance-matched firm’s discretionary accrual, tend to be the best specified measures 
of discretionary accruals across a wide variety of simulated event conditions…[M]atching on ROAt  produces less 
misspecified tests because the performance-related error in estimating the discretionary accrual of a treatment firms 
affects the treatment firm’s ROAt , which is matched with a control firm’s ROAt. Thus, the impact of performance-
related accrual on the properties of subsequent period’s estimated discretionary accrual of the treatment firm is 
better controlled for when matching is on ROAt than by matching on a lagged (i.e., stale) determinant, ROAt-1.” 
20 In untabulated analyses, we also use annual unexpected accruals and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals 
quality measure as proxies for misreporting, and our results are qualitatively similar. 
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(as in Equation (1)) in Columns 2 and 4. The number of observations for this analysis is smaller 
(i.e., 1,526 obs. and 1,508 obs. in the acquirer and target analyses, respectively) than that used in 
our main analyses because we exclude financial firms for this analysis and unexpected accruals are 
not estimable for some observations due to data restrictions. The coefficient estimates for Common 
auditor are negative and statistically significant in Columns 1 and 2, supporting our conjecture that 
acquirers engage in less earnings management prior to the acquisition when they share a common 
auditor with the target. While the coefficient estimates for Common auditor are also negative in 
Columns 3 and 4, they are statistically insignificant.21  Erickson and Wang (1999) show that 
acquiring firms manage earnings upward in the three quarters prior to the merger, but they do not 
find evidence of earnings management in target firms, potentially because many target firms often 
have little time to respond to M&A offers. Thus, our weaker findings for the disciplining effect of 
common auditors on misreporting by targets may be a function of lower power. 
For our second misreporting analysis, we examine whether the merging firms are less 
likely to restate earnings if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We focus on 
restatements filed by the newly merged firm for misreporting made within two years before the 
merger completion. This two-year window generally covers the fiscal year prior to the merger 
announcement as well as the fiscal year between the merger announcement and the deal 
completion, as more than 90 percent of the acquisitions in our sample complete the deal within one 
year from the merger announcement. 
We collect earnings restatements from Audit Analytics. Scholz (2008) argues that Audit 
Analytics is a more expansive database than other restatement data sources, as the Audit 
                                                        
21 Our results for acquirer unexpected accruals are largely driven by stock-for-stock deals. Untabulated results show 
that if we restrict the analysis to stock deals (882 out of 1,526 deals in Table 8), the coefficient on Common auditor 
is -0.034 and statistically significant at the five percent level, while the coefficient is -0.007 and statistically 
insignificant in all-cash deals (644 deals). For our target unexpected accruals analysis, the coefficient on Common 
auditor is still insignificant in both stock and cash deals (860 and 648 out of 1,508 deals in Table 8, respectively). 
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Analytics software extracts information from all EDGAR filings, which leads to a more efficient 
identification of restatements filed without being announced in a press release or a Form 8-K. 
Audit Analytics includes only restatements that correct misstated financial statements and 
exclude other financial statement changes. Following Bens et al. (2012), we eliminate all clerical 
application errors and include only accounting rule application failures and financial fraud to 
ensure that our sample includes material GAAP misapplications and not unintentional reporting 
errors. We use information about the beginning date of the misstatement period to identify 
earnings misstatements within a two-year window before the merger completion. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 present the marginal effects from the probit regression of 
Restatement on Common auditor without and with control variables, respectively, where 
Restatement is an indicator that equals one if the beginning date of the misstatement period 
falls within a two-year window before the merger completion and zero otherwise. The number 
of observations for this analysis drops to 1,356 because the coverage of restatements in Audit 
Analytics starts in 1996 and we use a two-year window to identify misreporting before the deal 
completion. As indicated in Column 5 (6), a common auditor M&A is associated with a 3.4 
(3.1) percentage point reduction in the likelihood of earnings restatements, as compared to a 
non-common-auditor M&A, and this marginal effect is statistically significant at the 5% (10%) 
level. Given that the sample mean of the restatement probability is 8.04 percent, the effect of 
common auditors in reducing the restatement probability is economically meaningful. 
Combined, the results in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 support our inferences that common auditors 




5. Additional analyses 
5.1. Strategic selection of auditor 
One potential concern with our finding is the endogenous choice of auditors by the acquirer 
and the target. In particular, either party may strategically hire a common auditor prior to the 
acquisition announcement to influence deal outcomes or for other reasons that lead to better 
M&A outcomes. To address this potential issue, we examine the tenure of the auditor. Our 
intuition is that for auditor selection to be a concern, there must be a change in auditor shortly 
before the acquisition. That is, it’s highly unlikely that firms switch auditors many years before 
an intended M&A to obtain the benefits of having a common auditor.  
We find that acquirer (target) auditors have an average tenure of 10.06 (7.23) years in 
common-auditor deals and 9.79 (7.46) years in non-common-auditor deals. Further, the acquirer 
(target) auditor's tenure is less than three years in 15.2% (18.3%) of the common-auditor sample, and 
in 16.5% (19.0%) of the non-common-auditor sample. So, merging firms do not appear to 
strategically select auditors for M&As. Nonetheless, we address the concern of strategic auditor 
selection using two additional tests. First, we create indicator variables that equal one if the acquirer’s 
or target’s auditor has a tenure less than three years and zero otherwise, then include interaction terms 
of Common auditor and these two indicator variables. If firms are being strategic in the appointment 
of common auditors, we should expect the common-auditor effect on M&A outcomes to be more 
pronounced for shorter-tenured auditors. In untabulated results neither of the interaction terms is 
significant, and the coefficient of Common auditor continues to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Second, we rerun our analysis on a subsample of acquisitions in which 
both the acquirer’s auditor and the target’s auditor have been with the firms for at least three years. 
The untabulated result is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those with the full sample.22  
                                                        
22 Our results are robust if we define short-tenured auditor as the ones whose tenure is less than or equal to one year 
prior to deal announcement.  
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5.2. Non-market based M&A quality measures   
In our main analyses, we use the acquisition announcement return as our proxy for M&A 
quality. In this section, we use two non-market based measures that have also been used in the 
literature for M&A quality: (1) post-acquisition change in ROA, ∆ROA, (Healy et al., 1992; 
Chen et al., 2007; Wang and Xie, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2014), 
and (2) the probability of a post-acquisition goodwill impairment, Prob_GW_Impair (Doellman 
and Ryngaert, 2010; Gu and Lev, 2011; Goodman et al., 2014). The advantages of these 
measures are that they are not as susceptible to market biases and they represent ex post (as 
opposed to ex ante) measures of M&A quality. ROA represents the actual economic benefits 
generated by the assets, as opposed to the market’s perception of the increase in value. Further, a 
goodwill impairment recorded in the post-acquisition period represents instances where the 
premium paid for the target’s assets is no longer justified. However, the main drawback of these 
measures lies in the difficulty in isolating the performance effects directly related to the 
acquisition from those of the rest of the firm. Therefore, we focus on acquisition announcement 
returns in our main analyses and provide supporting evidence using these ex post, non-market 
based measures in this section. 
We rerun our main analyses, i.e., Equations (1) and (2), where we substitute ∆ROA and 
Prob_GW_Impair as the dependent variables and estimate the models using OLS estimation and 
a probit regression, respectively. ∆ROA is measured as the three-year change in ROA, and 
Prob_GW_Impair is an indicator equal to one if there is a goodwill impairment in the three-year 
period following an acquisition that generates a large increase in goodwill (i.e., an increase 
in goodwill greater or equal to 1% of total assets), and zero otherwise. Due to data 
restrictions, our change in ROA sample declines from 1,971 to 1,684, but there is no sample 
attrition for the goodwill impairment analysis. In untabulated results, we find that when we 
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rerun Equation (1) with our non-market based M&A quality measures, the coefficient estimate for 
Common auditor is positive (negative) and statistically significant at the 1% level (10% level) when 
using ∆ROA (Prob_GW_Impair), consistent with our expectations and the results in Table 3 that 
common-auditor M&As are higher quality than non-common-auditor M&As. When we rerun our 
uncertainty analysis (Equation (2)), we find that the interaction coefficient estimate, β3, is 
positive and statistically significant in three of the four specifications using ∆ROA. Further, the 
coefficient estimate for β3 is negative across all four specifications using Prob_GW_Impair, 
suggesting a lower likelihood of post-acquisition goodwill impairments for common-auditor 
acquisitions with more uncertainty; however, the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Collectively, this evidence, along with that in Tables 3 and 4, suggests that common auditors 
have a greater impact on M&A quality when there is more uncertainty before the acquisition. 
5.3. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Section 201 of SOX increased restrictions on non-audit services, such as M&A advisory and 
consulting services, provided by independent auditors in an attempt to strengthen auditor 
independence. To the extent auditors were engaged in non-audit services before SOX and 
common auditors used these services to help their clients engage in better acquisitions, the 
common-auditor effect should be mitigated post-SOX. To examine this possibility, we partition 
our sample into pre- and post-SOX subperiods and rerun our analyses. We classify transactions 
announced between January 1988 and July 2002 (when SOX was enacted) as deals in the pre-SOX 
period, and those announced between August 2002 and December 2010 as deals in the post-SOX 
period. Untabulated results show that the common-auditor effect on acquisition announcement 
returns is similar between the pre- and post-SOX periods, suggesting that the higher quality M&As 
associated with common auditors are a result of reductions in uncertainty from (perhaps 
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informal) communications within the audit function rather than those within non-audit functions. 
An alternative possibility is that these communications shifted from non-audit functions to 
informal discussions within the audit function after SOX. We cannot rule out this possibility. 
5.4. Shared investment banks and shared directors 
Agrawal et al. (2013) and Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that shared investment banks and 
interlocked directors influence acquisition outcomes. To examine whether the common-auditor 
effect is incremental to the effects of shared investment banks or shared directors, we include a 
shared investment bank indicator and the shared director indicator in our model. Among our 
sample of 1,971 acquisitions, only five deals (0.25%) have shared investment banks, consistent 
with Agrawal et al. (2013), who also report a very low percentage of shared investment banks, i.e., 
98 out of 6,272 deals (1.6%). Further, among our sample of 961 deals with available data on shared 
directors, 93 deals (9.7%) have shared director, which is comparable to the 9.4% reported in Cai 
and Sevilir (2012).23 Untabulated results show that the coefficient on Common auditor remains 
positive and statistically significant even after we control for the shared investment bank indicator 
or the shared director indicator, suggesting that the common-auditor effect is incremental to the 
effect of shared directors and shared investment banks. 
5.5. Impact of specific auditors 
In our final analysis, we examine whether a particular auditor or subset of auditors drive 
the acquisition announcement returns in our main analyses. For example, Louis (2005) finds that 
acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms. 
Further, with the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, many firms switched auditors and may 
have strategically selected auditors based, in part, on their ability to help with upcoming M&As. 
                                                        
23 We do not include these related control variables in our main analyses, because there is such a significant drop  
(roughly 50%) in our sample size as a result of data restrictions on the shared director variable. 
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Accordingly, we conduct three tests. First, we restrict our sample to Big 4 clients only, which 
results in a sample of 1,813 observations. Second, we remove deals with Andersen clients 
(acquirer or target) in years 2001 and 2002. In both tests, our results continue to hold at the 1% level.  
Finally, we examine whether the common-auditor effect on announcement returns is 
stronger for one of the largest eight auditors in the sample (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, or Crowe 
Chizek & Company). Specifically, we include an interaction term, where we interact Common 
auditor with an indicator for a specific auditor. While Common auditor remains positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, none of the interaction terms are significant, suggesting 
that the common-auditor effect is not stronger for any particular auditor.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The acquisition process often involves significant uncertainty, which can negatively 
impact M&A quality by reducing managers’ ability to identify the most profitable investment 
projects. This paper examines whether M&A quality is higher when acquirers and targets share 
the same external auditor. Given their considerable knowledge regarding both the acquirer and 
the target, common auditors can help reduce uncertainty, and thus improve M&A quality, via (i) 
direct communications with the merging parties, (ii) enhanced financial statement comparability, 
and (iii) limiting misreporting.   
Using the acquisition announcement return to capture M&A quality, we find that M&As 
involving firms with a common auditor are of higher quality than M&As involving firms with 
different auditors. We also find that the common-auditor effect is stronger when there is greater 
pre-acquisition uncertainty. Collectively, these results are consistent with common auditors 
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reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, which leads to higher quality M&As. We then 
provide evidence on the three mechanisms through which common auditors reduce M&A 
uncertainty. With respect to the first mechanism, i.e., direct communications with the parties, we 
show the common-auditor effect is larger when the acquirer and target use the same local office 
of the common auditor, and we show there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with 
a common auditor. We then show that acquirers and targets with common auditors have more 
comparable financial statements (i.e., second mechanism) and less misreporting (i.e., third 
mechanism) than do those with different auditors. Combined, these results support our inferences 
that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, leading to higher quality M&As. 
Our study contributes along several dimensions. First, we contribute to the literature that 
examines the role of acquirer auditors or target auditors in M&As by providing new insights into 
the role of common auditors in M&As. Second, our study contributes to the literature on the real 
effects of accounting and auditing by showing that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the 
M&A process, and thus improve M&A quality. Third, we contribute to the large literature 
examining the effect of sharing an agent on economic outcomes by providing evidence on the 
impact of sharing an auditor on M&A outcomes. Finally, we complement concurrent work by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who also examine the role of common auditors in M&A outcomes. While 
we show that common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) 
find that the benefits accrue to the acquirers at the target’s expense. Further, they focus on the 
role of auditor quality in mitigating the conflict of interest, while we explore the mechanisms 
through which common auditors impact M&A outcomes and the role of pre-M&A uncertainty in 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition  Data source 
Panel A: Measures of acquisition performance   
ANN_CAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for a value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target using the market model 
estimated using the return data of two hundred trading days 
ending two months before the announcement date. The weights 
are based on the market capitalizations of the acquirer and the 
target at two months prior to the deal announcement. The 
target’s weight is adjusted for the acquirer’s toehold. 
 CRSP 
∆ROA The change in income before extraordinary items scaled by 
assets from three years before the acquisition announcement to 
three years after the acquisition completion. 
 Compustat 
Prob_GW_Impair Indicator variable equals one if a firm records goodwill 
impairment losses in the three-year period following an 
acquisition that generates a large increase in goodwill, and 
zero otherwise. A large increase in goodwill is defined as an 
increase in goodwill greater or equal to 1 percent of total 
assets.  
 Compustat 
   
Panel B: Auditor characteristics   
Common auditor Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target share 
the same audit firm and zero otherwise. 
 Compustat 
Big 4 auditor Indicator variable equals one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 




Indicator variable equals one if the auditor is the largest auditor 
based on clients’ assets in the two-digit SIC industry and its 
market share is at least 10% greater than that of the second 
auditor and zero otherwise. 
 Compustat 
   
Panel C: Acquirer and target firm characteristics   
Firm size Market value of equity in millions calculated as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at two months 
prior to the deal announcement. Natural logarithm of the market 




Sales minus the cost of goods sold, selling and general 
administrative expenses, and working capital change, scaled by 
book value of assets. 
 Compustat 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets over book value of assets.  Compustat 
Leverage  Book value of debt over book value of assets.  Compustat 
Pre-announcement 
stock price-run-up 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns during the two hundred trading 
days ending two months before the announcement date with 
CRSP value-weighted return as the market index. 
 CRSP 
   
Panel D: Deal characteristics   
Relative deal size Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity.  SDC, CRSP 
Percentage of 
stock financing 
Percentage of financing with stocks.  SDC 
Tender offer  Indicator variable equals one for tender offers and zero  SDC 
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otherwise. 
Hostile Indicator variable equals one if the bid is hostile and zero 
otherwise. 
 SDC 
Multiple bidders Indicator variable equals one if there is more than one bidder 
and zero otherwise. 
 SDC 
High-tech firms Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target are 
both from the high-tech industries as defined in Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise. 
 SDC 
   
Panel E: Additional controls   
Diversifying 
acquisition 
Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target do not 
share the same two-digit SIC code and zero otherwise. 
 SDC 
Corr(stock return) Correlation of stock returns between the acquirer and the target 





Indicator variable equals one if strategic alliances or joint 
ventures exist between the acquirer and the target in the three 
years prior to the deal announcement and zero otherwise. 
 SDC 
Toehold Acquirer’s percentage equity ownership in the target firm prior 
to the deal announcement. 
 SDC 
Local deal Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer’s headquarters is 
located within 100 kilometers of the target’s headquarters and 
zero otherwise. 
 SDC, Form 
10-K, 
Compustat 
   
Panel F: Uncertainty proxies   
Target sales growth Percentage change in sales from the previous year.  Compustat 
Target stock return 
volatility 
Daily stock return volatility over the one-year period ending two 




R&D expenditure scaled by sales.  Compustat 
Target Bid-ask 
spread 
Average of daily bid-ask spreads (scaled by the midpoint of the 





Table 1: Sample distribution 
This table presents the distribution of sample acquisitions by announcement year and by acquirer Fama 
and French 48 industry classification, respectively. Numbers for the full sample are presented first, 
followed by subsamples based on whether the acquirer and the target share a common auditor around the 
acquisition announcement. Common-auditor deals are the acquisition transactions in which the acquirer 
and the target share the same audit firm. Non-common-auditor deals are the transactions without shared 
auditors. 
 
Panel A: By announcement year 
 
  Common-auditor deals Non-common-auditor deals 
Year Full sample  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
1988 44 7 15.9 37 84.1 
1989 40 9 22.5 31 77.5 
1990 35 9 25.7 26 74.3 
1991 25 7 28.0 18 72.0 
1992 25 8 32.0 17 68.0 
1993 39 9 23.1 30 76.9 
1994 58 9 15.5 49 84.5 
1995 114 30 26.3 84 73.7 
1996 122 37 30.3 85 69.7 
1997 164 54 32.9 110 67.1 
1998 171 38 22.2 133 77.8 
1999 173 52 30.1 121 69.9 
2000 167 51 30.5 116 69.5 
2001 108 34 31.5 74 68.5 
2002 67 15 22.4 52 77.6 
2003 81 18 22.2 63 77.8 
2004 74 24 32.4 50 67.6 
2005 84 27 32.1 57 67.9 
2006 108 25 23.1 83 76.9 
2007 97 29 29.9 68 70.1 
2008 53 11 20.8 42 79.2 
2009 63 24 38.1 39 61.9 
2010 59 20 33.9 39 66.1 





Panel B: By acquirer Fama and French 48 industry classification 
 
  Common-auditor deals Non-common-auditor deals 
 Industry Full sample  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Agriculture 3 0 0.0 3 100.0 
Food products 22 4 18.2 18 81.8 
Candy and soda 4 1 25.0 3 75.0 
Beer and liquor 2 0 0.0 2 100.0 
Tobacco products 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 
Recreation 21 5 23.8 16 76.2 
Entertainment 26 4 15.4 22 84.6 
Printing and publishing 16 1 6.3 15 93.8 
Consumer goods 28 6 21.4 22 78.6 
Apparel 11 0 0.0 11 100.0 
Health care 45 15 33.3 30 66.7 
Medical equipment 78 30 38.5 48 61.5 
Pharmaceutical products 117 28 23.9 89 76.1 
Chemicals 36 8 22.2 28 77.8 
Rubber and plastic products 8 1 12.5 7 87.5 
Textiles 5 3 60.0 2 40.0 
Construction materials 24 6 25.0 18 75.0 
Construction 14 4 28.6 10 71.4 
Steel works etc. 26 5 19.2 21 80.8 
Fabricated products 6 0 0.0 6 100.0 
Machinery 51 16 31.4 35 68.6 
Electrical equipment 15 5 33.3 10 66.7 
Automobiles and trucks 20 5 25.0 15 75.0 
Aircraft 8 0 0.0 8 100.0 
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 7 5 71.4 2 28.6 
Defense 4 0 0.0 4 100.0 
Precious metals 9 4 44.4 5 55.6 
Mining 3 1 33.3 2 66.7 
Coal 2 1 50.0 1 50.0 
Petroleum and natural gas 96 22 22.9 74 77.1 
Utilities 58 27 46.6 31 53.4 
Communication 93 22 23.7 71 76.3 
Personal services 12 1 8.3 11 91.7 
Business services 304 70 23.0 234 77.0 
Computers 244 70 28.7 174 71.3 
Electronic equipment 17 6 35.3 11 64.7 
Measuring/control equipment 67 16 23.9 51 76.1 
Business supplies 20 8 40.0 12 60.0 
Shipping containers 3 2 66.7 1 33.3 
Transportation 24 10 41.7 14 58.3 
Wholesale 49 9 18.4 40 81.6 
Retail 74 19 25.7 55 74.3 
Restaurants, hotels, motels 28 13 46.4 15 53.6 
Banking 72 23 31.9 49 68.1 
Insurance 90 31 34.4 59 65.6 
Real estate 4 2 50.0 2 50.0 
Trading 91 33 36.3 58 63.7 
Other 12 3 25.0 9 75.0 
Total 1,971 547 27.8 1,424 72.2 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of announcement returns and control variables. All variables 
are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 











  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ANN_CAR[-1,+1] 1.91*** 1.22*** 2.67*** 1.44*** 1.61*** 1.14*** 1.06*** 0.30** 
ANN_CAR[-2,+2] 1.97*** 1.29*** 2.74*** 1.73*** 1.68*** 1.18*** 1.06*** 0.54** 
ANN_CAR[-3,+3] 1.99*** 1.18*** 2.89*** 1.66*** 1.65*** 1.00*** 1.24*** 0.66** 
 
Panel B: Control variables 
  Full sample    






auditor deals Difference 
Auditor characteristics           
Acquirer Big 4 auditor 0.97 0.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.02** 
Target Big 4 auditor 0.94 0.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.05*** 
Acquirer auditor industry 
dominance 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.02 
Target auditor industry 
dominance 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.06*** 
           
Acquirer characteristics           
Firm size 8,990 20,909 1,743 461 6,398 9,095 8,949 146 
Operating cash flows  0.12 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.12 -0.01 
Tobin’s Q 2.30 1.86 1.69 1.23 2.59 2.27 2.30 -0.03 
Leverage  0.21 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.01 
Pre-announcement stock 
price-run-up 0.07 0.35 0.02 -0.13 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.01 
           
Target characteristics           
Firm size 870 1,929 196 62 727 915 853 62 
Operating cash flows 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.08 -0.02** 
Tobin’s Q 1.99 1.61 1.44 1.10 2.16 1.92 2.02 -0.09 
Leverage  0.22 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.36 0.22 0.22 0.01 
Pre-announcement stock 
price-run-up 0.00 0.40 -0.05 -0.25 0.17 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
           
Deal characteristics           
Relative deal size 0.49 0.96 0.20 0.07 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.00 
Percentage of stock 
financing 46.91 45.01 45.64 0.00 100.00 46.20 47.19 -0.99 
Tender offer 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.24 -0.02 
Hostile bid 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01* 
Multiple bidders 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 -0.03** 
High-tech firms 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 
         
Additional controls           
Diversifying acquisition 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.35 -0.02 
Corr(stock return) 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.29 0.21 0.18 0.03*** 
Previous business relation 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Toehold 3.12 11.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.86 2.45 2.41*** 
Local deal 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.16 0.11*** 
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Table 3: Common auditors and acquisition announcement returns 
This table presents results from the regression of acquisition announcement returns. The dependent variable is 
ANN_CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target from 
one day before to one day after the deal announcement. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the 
regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
 Variable (1) (2) 
Common auditor 1.166*** 1.064*** 
 (2.967) (2.911) 
Auditor characteristics 
Acquirer Big 4 auditor -1.109 
 (-1.027) 
Target Big 4 auditor 0.400 
 (0.645) 
Acquirer auditor industry dominance 0.033 
 (0.064) 
Target auditor industry dominance -0.077 
 (-0.154) 
Acquirer and target firm characteristics 
Acquirer size -0.742*** 
 (-5.959) 
Acquirer Operating cash flows 1.940 
 (0.888) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q -0.052 
 (-0.386) 
Acquirer leverage 2.018* 
 (1.906) 
Acquirer pre-announcement stock price-run-up -1.058 
 (-1.631) 
Target Operating cash flows -0.155 
 (-0.113) 
Target Tobin’s Q -0.164 
 (-1.069) 
Target leverage -2.537*** 
 (-2.972) 
Target pre-announcement stock price-run-up -0.525 
 (-1.151) 
Deal characteristics 
Relative deal size 1.387*** 
 (6.200) 
Percentage of stock financing -0.033*** 
 (-7.687) 
Tender offer 1.028** 
 (2.320) 
Hostile bid 2.792** 
 (2.399) 
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Multiple bidders 0.307 
 (0.402) 
High-tech firms -0.774 
 (-1.240) 
Additional controls 
Diversifying acquisition -0.861** 
 (-2.374) 
Corr(stock return) 2.176** 
 (2.091) 








Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 1,971 1,971 













Table 4: Common-auditor effect and target uncertainty 
This table presents regression results with interaction terms of common auditor and target uncertainty 
proxies. The dependent variable is ANN_CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target from one day before to one day after the deal announcement. The other 
variables are defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and 
Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Common auditor 0.785** -0.823 0.992*** -0.852 
 
(2.117) (-1.057) (2.702) (-1.148) 
Common auditor * Target sales growth 0.928** 
   
 
(2.026) 
   
Target sales growth -0.044 
   
 
(-1.225) 
   


















   
(3.814) 
 




   
(-3.923) 
 
Common auditor * Target bid-ask spread 
   
37.430** 
    
(2.532) 
Target bid-ask spread 
   
-16.330* 
    
(-1.764) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 




Table 5: Analyses of same-office common auditors 
This table presents results from the regression of acquisition announcement returns on same- and 
different-office common auditor indicators. The dependent variable is ANN_CAR, the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target from one day before to one 
day after the deal announcement. Same-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer 
and the target share a common auditor from the same local office and zero otherwise, and Different-office 
common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor from 
different local offices and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the 
regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests.  
 
 Variable (1) (2) 
Common auditor 1.125*** 
(3.413) 












Acquirer Big 4 auditor -1.097 -1.093 
 
(-1.334) (-1.325) 
Target Big 4 auditor 0.273 0.290 
 
(0.472) (0.501) 
Acquirer auditor industry dominance -0.122 -0.112 
 
(-0.284) (-0.261) 
Target auditor industry dominance -0.275 -0.261 
 
(-0.630) (-0.597) 
Acquirer and target firm characteristics 
  
Acquirer size -0.644*** -0.639*** 
 
(-5.835) (-5.782) 
Acquirer Operating cash flows -0.095 -0.092 
 
(-0.857) (-0.840) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q 1.695* 1.689* 
 
(1.709) (1.705) 
Acquirer leverage 1.325 1.294 
 
(0.697) (0.682) 
Acquirer pre-announcement stock price-run-up -0.149 -0.150 
 
(-0.268) (-0.270) 
Target Operating cash flows 0.016 0.015 
 
(0.120) (0.115) 
Target Tobin’s Q -1.573** -1.562** 
 
(-2.068) (-2.053) 
Target leverage 0.500 0.455 
 
(0.401) (0.367) 






Relative deal size 0.899*** 0.901*** 
 
(4.455) (4.457) 
Percentage of stock financing -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 
(-7.309) (-7.331) 
Tender offer 0.537 0.524 
 
(1.394) (1.359) 
Hostile bid 1.117 1.183 
 
(0.925) (0.979) 
Multiple bidders 0.550 0.558 
 
(0.703) (0.709) 





Diversifying acquisition -0.432 -0.425 
 
(-1.322) (-1.301) 
Corr(stock return) 1.716* 1.702* 
 
(1.876) (1.857) 
Previous business relation 0.567 0.602 
 
(0.509) (0.545) 
Toehold 0.006 0.003 
 
(0.417) (0.191) 
Local deal 0.402 0.119 
 
(1.078) (0.289) 
   
Test: Same-office common auditor  F-statistic = 2.80 
              = Different-office common auditor  Prob > F = 0.0945 
   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 1,591 1,591 








Table 6: Common auditors and M&A likelihood  
This table presents probit regression results of the probability of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions (marginal effect reported). For each acquirer (target), we define the set of all potential 
acquirer (target) firms as the ones in the same three-digit standard industrial classification industry with 
similar size (within 20 percent band of market capitalization). Our dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that equals one if an M&A transaction takes place between the potential acquirer and the 
potential target and zero otherwise. ROA is operating income before depreciation, scaled by book value of 
total assets. Stock return is stock returns over the one-year period ending two months prior to the deal 
announcement. Industry Herfindahl is the sum of the squares of the sales market shares over all firms 
within the industry. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for 
calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
 Variable (1) (2) 
Common auditor 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (8.199) (7.223) 
Acquirer characteristics     
Acquirer size   0.001*** 
   (9.507) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q   -0.000 
   (-0.732) 
Acquirer leverage    -0.001* 
   (-1.764) 
Acquirer ROA    0.001 
   (1.543) 
Acquirer sales growth   0.000** 
   (2.281) 
Acquirer stock return   0.000* 
   (1.791) 
Acquirer stock return volatility   -0.030*** 
   (-4.051) 
Acquirer industry Herfindahl   -0.027*** 
   (-2.688) 
Target characteristics     
Target size   0.001*** 
   (5.147) 
Target Tobin’s Q   -0.000** 
   (-2.409) 
Target leverage    0.000 
   (0.867) 
Target ROA    0.001** 
   (2.432) 
Target sales growth   -0.001*** 
   (-4.331) 
Target stock return   -0.000 
   (-1.484) 
Target stock return volatility   -0.005 
   (-0.939) 
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Target industry Herfindahl   0.047*** 
   (7.236) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 232,604 232,604 





Table 7: Common auditors and financial statement comparability 
This table presents regression results of financial statement comparability measures. The dependent variable 
in Column 1 is Diff_Total_Accruals, the absolute value of the difference in total accruals between the 
acquirer and the target in the year prior to acquisition announcement, where total accruals are calculated as 
the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations, scaled by 
beginning of year total assets. The dependent variable in Column 2 is ECOMP_COV, the earnings co-
movement between the acquirer and the target in the 16 quarters prior to acquisition announcement. In the 
total accruals difference regression, we control for the minimum value of and the difference in size, 
leverage, market-to-book, cash flow from operations, losses, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation 
of cash flow from operations, and standard deviation of sales growth. In the earnings comovement 
regression, we also control for cash flow comovement and return comovement across 16 consecutive 
quarters. Refer to Francis et al. (2014) for definitions of control variables. All the regressions include 
controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and 
firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 




Variable Diff_Total_Accruals ECOMP_COV 
Common auditor -0.020** 0.026* 
 
(-2.215) (1.742) 
Size_diff -0.006 0.008 
 
(-1.490) (1.270) 
Size_min -0.004 0.002 
 
(-0.808) (0.255) 
LEV_diff 0.041 -0.092** 
 
(1.165) (-2.202) 
LEV_min -0.000 -0.024 
 
(-0.014) (-0.456) 
MB_diff 0.010 -0.010* 
 
(1.286) (-1.837) 













LossProb_diff 0.023 -0.046 
 
(1.538) (-1.601) 
LossProb_min 0.030 0.005 
 
(1.094) (0.134) 
STD_Sales_diff -0.000 -0.000** 
 
(-1.214) (-2.047) 
STD_Sales_min -0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.438) (0.807) 
STD_CFO_diff 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.916) (-0.625) 




STD_Sales_Grth_diff -0.007* -0.006 
 
(-1.788) (-1.016) 













   
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 1,679 1,513 
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 0.029 
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Table 8: Common auditors and earnings misreporting 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of earnings management and probit regression 
results of earnings restatement (marginal effect reported). The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is 
aggregate quarterly unexpected current accruals of the acquirer over the three quarters prior to the deal 
announcement. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is aggregate quarterly unexpected current 
accruals of the target over the three quarters prior to the deal announcement. The dependent variable in 
Columns 5 and 6 is an indicator variable that equals one if the beginning date of the misstatement period 
falls within a two-year window before the merger completion and zero otherwise. The other variables are 
defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and 
French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t/Z-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Acquiror UA Target UA Restatement 
Common auditor -0.024** -0.024** -0.017 -0.015 -0.034** -0.031* 
 
(-2.214) (-2.181) (-0.906) (-0.746) (-2.004) (-1.920) 
Auditor characteristics 
      




















































Acquirer and target firm characteristics 

























































































































      


















































































































































       
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,526 1,526 1,508 1,508 1,356 1,356 
Adj. /Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.050 0.021 0.045 0.059 0.117 
 
 
  
  
